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The Polish liberalization and stabilization program put into
effect on January 1, 1990, called for the removal of virtually all
price controls1, and for a sharp curtailment of production
subsidies. These measures magnified the effects of pre-existing
inflationary forces. Within one month retail price index rose by
79.6 per cent. The inflation was, however, quickly brought under
control by the stabilization measures adopted as a part of the
reform package2. By August the rate of price increase declined to
a 1.8 per cent monthly rate. Yet the goal of complete price
stability by year-end proved to be elusive. In 1991 prices still
rose by over 7 0 percent; in the subsequent years inflation slowed
down, but it remained at a two-digit level (Table 1).
!
. The reform reduced the extent of administered prices from
50 per cent to 10 per cent. On January 1, 1990 the administered
price of domestic coal was raised by 600 per cent and that of coal
for industrial use by 4 00 per cent. Railway freight charges and
electric rates were raised by 2 00 per cent. Periodic further upward
adjustment in administered prices took place over the next years;
coal prices were decontrolled in 1993.
2
. The fiscal deficit was to be reduced from 7.5 per cent of
the GDP in 1989 to 1 per cent in 1990. The January 1990 volume of
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Sources: A - GUS (Central Statistical Office)
B: Ministry of Finance and World Bank estimates, as
reported in World Bank (1994) . The fiscal deficit estimate for 1994
was reported in Rzeczpospolita no. 259 (3908) of November 7, 1994
To throw light on the causes of the persistence of inflation,
let us briefly examine Poland's post - 1990 monetary and exchange
rate policy.
Inflation in the fixed exchange rate period.
The history of Polish stabilization may be divided into three
distinct periods: the fixed exchange rate period (January 1, 1990-
May 17, 1991, which was followed by the periodic adjustment period
(which lasted till August 27, 1993) and by the crawling peg
period.
The Solidarity-led regime which was formed in the Fall of 1989
inherited a partially liberalized and half-dismantled command
system, and an economy hovering on the verge of a hyperinflation.3
During the last quarter of the year the new government took
measures to limit the rate of expansion of the net domestic assets,
and also to reduce the gap between the official exchange rate of
3
. See, for instance, The World Bank (1987)
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the zloty and the free market rate. These steps were a preliminary
to the January 1, 1990 introduction of a comprehensive
stabilization and liberalization program known as the "Balcerowicz
Plan"4
Among the key goals of the Balcerowicz Plan was the
restoration of a stable, convertible currency. Initially, the zloty
was made internally convertible. The official exchange rate which
stood at 5,560 zl/$ during the last week of December 1989, was set
at 9,500 zl/$ - somewhat below the then-prevailing black market
rate. The government pledged to maintain the initial exchange
rate for three months, after which it could be adjusted, if
necessary. The zloty was deliberately undervalued to enable the
government to adhere to its pledge in the face of the expected
liberalization - induced upward price adjustment.
The adoption of the limited-horizon-fixed exchange rate policy
was motivated, on one hand, by the wish to "anchor" the zloty, and,
on the other, by the desire to leave room for readjustment, should
the initial rate turn out to be inappropriate. Yet such a policy
carried a high risk of encouraging destabilizing speculation.
In order to restrict credit expansion, the NBP sought to
4
. For a discussion of the 1989 mini-stabilization and of the
"Balcerowicz Plan" see Stanislaw Wellisz, Henryk Kierzkowski and
Marek Okolski (1993)
maintain interest rates at a positive real level5. The forecast on
the basis of which the NBP set the January discount rate severely
underestimated the increase in the price index, and the real return
on zloty deposits was, in fact, negative, while in February and in
March it barely exceeded zero. But a holder of a dollar account,or
of a dollar hoard, who switched to a zloty account at the beginning
of January and back to dollars at the end of the guaranteed fixed
exchange rate period could have earned in three months a 7 0 per
cent return on his dollar savings! Polish households' dollar
holdings, estimated at $6 to $9 billion, exceeded the official
reserves by a factor of two or more. Even though Poland obtained a
$1 stabilization loan, large-scale speculation could have
precipitated a collapse of the exchange rate. However, the
government's declaration that the rate would remain fixed for
three months seemingly lacked credibility. Very little switching
and re-switching took place. Thus, paradoxically, the lack of
credibility facilitated the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate.
Devaluation at the close of the three month period turned out not
to be necessary.
The restrictive fiscal and monetary measures seemed to work
"too well". Originally it was foreseen that under the IMF-approved
stabilization plan the fiscal budget would be in deficit during the
first half of the year; this deficit was to be balanced by a second
5
 The National Bank of Poland's discount rate for January,
February and March was set, respectively, at 3 6 per cent, 2 0 per
cent and 10 per cent per month.
half of the year surplus. Likewise, an initial balance of payments
deficit was to be compensated by a later surplus, so that, for the
year as a whole, both accounts would be in balance. In fact,
however, at mid year the fiscal budget was in surplus. So was the
balance of payments - and foreign reserves accumulated at an
unwonted rate6. There were signs of a forthcoming recession: the
volume of credit (in real terms) declined more sharply than
planned. Output was plummeting, and unemployment was beginning to
rise. The excessive stringency resulted in an excessively rapid
accumulation of reserves. The relaxation of monetary and fiscal
policies seemed to be in order; the IMF goals could be met even in
the face of fiscal and balance of payments deficits in the closing
months of the year.
The immediate effects of fiscal and monetary relaxation were
positive. The recession appeared to be stemmed, while inflation
continued to abate. By September, however, prices began to rise
again, while the positive effects of the monetary stimulus appeared
to wear off. The government reverted to a contractionary policy,
6
 In order to slow down the growth of reserves the government
put into effect temporary tariff reductions and suspensions. As a
result, the unweighted average rate of protection declined from
11.65 % to 5.82% See Nogaj, Mieczyslaw (1992) p. 65.
but, in view of a deepening recession, it stopped short of drastic
measures.
In 1991 the recession deepened. Profits of State-owned
enterprises declined very sharply, depriving the government of a
major source of revenue7. The fiscal budget was, once again, in
deficit. (Table 1)
In the face of a fixed exchange rate rising prices led to a
continuing real appreciation of the zloty - a highly undesirable
development at a time of deepening recession. On May 17, 1991 the
government reacted by reducing the nominal value of the zloty to
11,000 zl/$.
Did the dollar peg help stabilize Polish prices? The initial
announcement that the zloty would remain internally convertible
into dollars at a fixed exchange rate for a three month period was
meant to calm inflationary expectations. The announcement proved
not to be credible, hence it did not accomplish its task. The
dollar "anchor" was meant to stabilize Polish prices by providing
a linkage with world prices. But, as long as the zloty was
undervalued, the dollar link exercised an upward price pull. When,
7
. In 1990 State-owned enterprises registered high profits,
which reflected (1) lags in the revaluation of inventories and of
depreciation allowances in the face of a rapid price rise, and (2)
the increased zloty value of foreign exchange accounts held by
enterprises. In 1991 and in 1992 the State owned enterprise as a
whole recorded losses.
as a result of the rise of internal prices, the "anchor" began to
hold, the zloty-dollar link was severed.
The crawl-cum-mini-devaluations period
The May 1991 mini-devaluation was accompanied by a switch
form the dollar "anchor" to a trade-weighted foreign exchange
basket8 This shift was not unjustified. Because of the
fluctuations of the dollar-ECU exchange rate, the zloty-dollar
linkage introduced an extraneous disturbing factor in the trade
between Poland, and Western Europe, Poland's main trading partner.
But the linkage to a basket does not have the transparency, and it
does not carry the credibility, of a linkage to a single, strong
currency. The abandonment of the dollar standard looked like a
signal of retreat from the fixed exchange rate policy.
On October 1, 1991 the fixed parity was replaced by a
"crawling peg". The initial rate of crawl was set at 1.8 per cent
per month (about 24 per cent per year). On February 26, 1992 the
zloty was devalued by an additional 12 per cent. Another
devaluation (this time by 8 per cent) came on August 27, 1993, but,
at the same time, the rate of the "crawl" rate was cut to 1.6 per
cent per month.
Throughout the "crawl-cum-mini devaluations" period the NBP
8
 The US$ was assigned a weight of 45%, the DM 35%, the Pound
Sterling 10%, and the French and Swiss Francs 5% each.
followed closely what Rudiger Dornbusch called the "PPP -oriented
exchange rate rule". The adherence to this rule tends, on one hand
"to maintain the exchange rate constant, thereby stabilizing
demand. On the other... [t]he exchange rate affects costs and
prices through the domestic cost of imported intermediate goods"9.
Between the second quarter of 1991 and the second quarter of 1993
foreign reserves remained at an approximately constant level, and
so did the real exchange rate (Table 2) The exchange rate
adjustment system mimicked, as it were, a policy of flexible
exchange, putting the entire responsibility on the maintenance of
price stability on the domestic fiscal and monetary authorities.
9
. Dornbusch (1982) p. 159
8
Table 2
Indexes of Consumer prices and of the real effective exchange rate,
1991-1994 (1990 =100) and foreign currency reserves ($ billion).





































































The 1991-1993 Polish inflation: some statistical measures
Let us now inquire into the sources of inflation in the
"crawl-cum-mini devaluations" period.
In 1991-1993 the Polish economy was still in an early stage of
transition. Given the fledgling banking system there was
possibility of an atypical price response to fiscal and monetary
stimuli. Possibly, too, exogenous shocks (changes in the tariff
structure, in the internal tax structure, adjustments in the
administered prices of transport and of energy) may have had a
marked effect on the inflation rate.
To throw light on these issues we shall compare the behavior
of the Polish economy with that of other countries.10
We first address the issues of the role of money and of
banking in the Polish economy. The Polish M2/GDP and credit/ GDP
ratios are lower than those in Western Europe, United States, or
Japan. Cross-section regressions show, However, that the degree of
monetization, as measured by the M2/GDP ratio, is positively,
related to the GDP per capita11 The actual degree of monetization
10
. The following discussion is based on cross-section
comparisons for the years 1991, 1992 and 1993. The analysis
utilizes IMF data for all countries of the world, except for
countries with fewer than 2 million inhabitants. The sample size
varies, since not all data are available for all the IMF-member
countries for all three years. The differences in coverage are of
minor importance since the estimates for the three years are highly
consistent. It should also be pointed out that the IMF figures
utilized in the analysis, were obtained by converting national
currencies into dollars at official exchange rates. This method of
conversion introduces "white noise". Summers and Heston (1991)
also shows that such figures are biased against the low-income
countries.
11
 The following are the relevant statistics of the regression
of M2/GDP on GDP/capita (where GDP is measured in '000 US$)
Year # of Adj. F Prob Regr. T Prob.
observ. R2 value >F coeff. value >T
1991 79 0.3665 46.127 0.0001 0.019807 6.792 0.0001
1992 70 0.3764 42.642 0.0001 0.017863 6.530 0.0001
1993 56 0.4553 46.977 0.0001 0.019499 6.854 0.0001
It should be noted that the inclusion of GDP in the denominator on
the LHS and in the numerator on the RHS biases the results against
the hypothesis that the "depth" of monetization increases with the
level of development.
10
of Poland does not deviate in a statistically significant fashion
from the degree of monetization predicted by the regression of
M2/GDP on GDP/Capita12.
Financial institutions play a greater role in the economically
leading countries, than in countries which are less developed. But
in this respect, too, Poland does not deviate to any significant
extent from the general pattern.13
Let us consider how good is a purely monetary explanation of
inflation, i.e, how serious an error we shall commit if we fail to
take into account the non-monetary shocks. The simplest possible
model expresses the annual rate of inflation as a function of the
growth of M2 in the same year, and it ignores such important
issues as the presence of adjustment lags, the nature of
inflationary expectations, and the rate of GDP growth. Despite the
12
. The relevant statistics are:
Year Actual Predicted St. err. Resi- St. err.
value value predict. -dual. resid.
1991 0.3163 0.3760 0.028 -0.0597 0.219
1992 0.3576 0.3963 0.029 -0.0387 0.212
1993 0.3594 0.4124 0.031 -0.0530 0.265
13
. A cross- section regression of the domestic credit/M2 ratio
on GDP/capita using a sample of 80 countries, yields an Adjusted R2
= 0.54, (significant on the 0.01 per cent level) and a positive
regression coefficient statistically significant on the 0.007
level. The actual value of the Credit/M2 ratio for Poland does not
deviate significantly from the value predicted by the regression.
11
oversimplifications, the model explains 60% of the inter-country
variance of inflation14. The same relation holds for the
economically leading countries and for all others 15 . For Poland,
the actual and the predicted rates of inflation are almost
identical. We thus conclude that, as a first approximation, we may
rely on a monetary explanation of the Polish inflation.
We now shift our attention to the sources of money creation.
During the "crawl plus mini-devaluations" period the Ml multiplier
remained constant, but the M2 multiplier increased by about 15 per
cent (Table 3) This, however, accounts for a small fraction of the
expansion of broad money and of the strength of the inflationary
push.




















. The coefficient of a dummy variable, inserted to
distinguish between the economically leading countries and the rest









































































Source of data: IMF
Received economic doctrine points to fiscal deficits as the
major cause of inflation.. To quote Fischer and Easterly,
"Rapid money growth is conceivable without an underlying
fiscal imbalance , but it is unlikely. Thus rapid inflation
is almost always a fiscal phenomenon."16
The theory underlying this statement has a venerable history going
back to Keynes who pointed out that
"inflationary finance is the form of taxation which the public
finds hardest to evade and even the weakest government can
enforce, when it cannot enforce anything else" 17
16 Fischer and Easterly (1990) p. 139
17
. Keynes (1924) p. 46. For a recent discussion of the
rationale of taxation-through-inflation, see Vegh (1989)
13
A crude rule of thumb is that the higher the fiscal the
proportion of the fiscal deficit to the GDP, the stronger the
inflationary push. This "rule" turns out to be highly
unsatisfactory. For our sample as a whole the cross-section
relation between the FD/GDP ratio and the rate of inflation is
statistically insignificant. A division into a sub-sample
consisting of 19 highly developed countries (group D) and a sub-
sample that includes all the others (group L) shows that;
-In group "D" there is a statistically weakly significant
positive relation between the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio and the
inflation rate18.
-The "L" countries, as a group are more inflation prone than
the "D" countries: in 34 of the 37 cases they have higher
inflation rates than the statistical relation between the
FD/GDP ratio and the inflation rate for the "D" group would
indicate.19 It is probable that "D" countries tend to
monetize a hign^r proportion of their deficit irhan the "Dfl
countries.
-In the case of "L" countries the relation between the FD/GDP
18
. The adjusted R2 = 0.115; F=3.342, significant on the 8.5%
level.
19
 The difference between the two groups of countries is
statistically significant. The F test value equals 4.03. For a F
ttst value of 3.23 the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level;
for F= 5.18 - at the 1% level.
14
ratio and the rate of inflation is statistically
insignificant. This means that the FD/GDP ratio cannot be used
as a predictor of the rate of inflation in an "L" country
A somewhat more sophisticated measure takes into account the
degree of monetization of the deficit:
R/GDP(P + G) = FD/GDP
where: R = Reserve money
P = inflation rate
(5 = rate of growth of output
FD = fiscal deficit.
from which: P = R/DF - G
When applied to the Polish data for the years 1991, 1992 and 1993
it yields:
Table 4
Actual and estimated inflation 1991-1993 (previous year =100)
Year Consumer price index Producer price index
Actual estimated Actual estimated
1991 177 173 148 158
1992 145 143 128 138
1993 135 128 132 125
Source: Based on IMF data
The estimates are remarkably close to the actual figures: in
four out of six cases the estimates are marginally lower than the
actual figures; in the two other cases they are marginally higher.
15
The slight downward bias of the estimates may reflect the increase
in the magnitude of the M2 multiplier (Table 3).
Let us muster one more piece of evidence. As Table 5 shows,
between the end of the second quarter of 1991 and the end of the
third quarter of 1993 the claims of the NBP on General Government,
expressed in constant zlotys, rose by a factor of 7.5. During the
same period foreign assets of the NBP remained virtually constant.
It is clear, therefore, that the monetization of the fiscal deficit
acted as the "motor of inflation".
Table 5
Claims on General Government and Foreign Assets of the NBP
in billions of zlotys at 1990 prices
Year Quarter Claims on GG. Foreign assets
















Source od data: IMF. Calculated by deflating the current zloty
figures by the consumer price index (1990=100)
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The "pure crawl" period
The "pure crawl" policy represents, in a sense, a
continuation of the PPP - oriented policy of the "crawl-cum-mini
devaluations" period. Yet while in the earlier period the changes
in the official exchange rate tracked the market equilibrium
valuation of the zloty, in the later period the exchange rate was
set in accordance with a sliding parity schedule. The rate of
downward slide was periodically modified, yet, at all times the
zloty was undervalued in real terms. Such a policy of "active
exchange management"
"... has become increasingly prevalent among developing
countries in recent years. With a view toward preserving
competitiveness these countries have frequently adopted
rules under which the nominal exchange rate is depreciated
continuously to offset differences between domestic and
foreign inflation rates... such rules which effectively target
the real exchange rate establish a feedback mechanism from
domestic inflation to the nominal exchange rate".20
Starting in mid- 1993 Poland's foreign reserves began rapidly
to accumulate (Table 5 and fig. 1). The influx of foreign exchange
swelled the money base (Table 5) To slow down the foreign exchange
inflow, the rate of "crawl" was cut, in mid-1994, to 1.4 per cent
per month, and in January, 1995 to 1.2 per cent per month. Yet
reserves continued to rise: at the end of the second quarter of
1993 they stood at $3.3 billion; at the end of the fourth quarter
20
 Montiel and Ostry (1992) pp 58-59
17
of 1994 at $5.7, and the rise continued during the first quarter of
1995.- proof that the zloty was still undervalued.
Available statistics fail to reveal what caused the foreign
exchange inflow. Preliminary figures indicate that though the
balance of payments has been improving in 1993 and 1994 it is still
in deficit - hence the country should be losing, rather than to be
gaining reserves. But these figures do not take into account the
border trade with the former Soviet Union countries. Possibly, too,
there was an unrecorded influx of speculative capital. The Polish
interest rates, in constant zloty terms, tend to be very low. For
instance, during the last quarter of 1994 the NBP constant zloty
discount rate was approximately zero (Table 6) . However, given the
1.4 per cent monthly crawl rate, the discount rate in terms of
dollars amounted to 12.5 per cent - a rate than was possibly
sufficiently high to attract speculative funds. How important was
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Source of data: IMF. Col. (A) end of quarter;
col (B) QIV, 1994\QIV, 1993. Col (C) calculated from (A) and (B)
The policy of independent determination of the rate of slide
of the zloty and of the nominal interest rate opened the NBP to
conflicting pressures of interest groups. The undervaluation of the
zloty was, clearly, to the advantage of export-oriented and of
import-substituting sectors of the economy. But undervaluation
resulted in the accumulation of foreign exchange. To control
inflation, the NBP attempted to sterilize the growing foreign
reserves. However, a tight-money policy ran counter the interests
of borrowers, and, in the first place of the government, which
sought to issue new debt at the least possible cost.
These conflict point to a fundamental flaw. As long as the
rate of "slide" is set so as to result in the continuing real
overvaluation of the zloty, international prices exercise an upward
pull on domestic prices. The sliding undervalued currency policy
19
leads to a "vicious circle" of devaluations and of price
increases21. Thus, even if the 1994 influx of reserves had been
completely sterilized, the 1.4 per cent monthly rate of "slide" of
the zloty would have resulted in a 15 per cent annual inflation. In
fact the NBP's nominal interest rate was too low to achieve full
sterilization, but, NBP's critics say, it was so high (in dollar
terms) as to attract speculators and (in zloty terms) as to hinder
recovery. Clearly, however, a lower nominal interest structure
would have led to an even faster rise in prices. The only
solution to the dilemma is to eliminate undervaluation, and to make
a clear choice: either select an exchange "anchor" and adopt a
passive fiscal and the monetary policy, or by assume fiscal and
monetary responsibility for the rate of money supply, and let the
market determine the exchange rate.
It thus would seem that (except for putting pressure on the
NBP to reduce the nominal interest rates) the fiscal authorities
are exonerated from contributing to the inflation during the "pure
crawl" period. Indeed, though the government failed to achieve a
budgetary balance, the fiscal deficits did not feed the inflation.
In fact, the real value of NBP loans to the government declined
(Tables 1 and 5 and fig. 1). This does not mean that the deficits
did no harm to the economy. The government borrowed from commercial
banks. To remain within credit limits the banks cut back on lending
for industrial and commercial purposes (Fig. 2). Government
21
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borrowing added to the demand for loanable funds; real interests
rose and productive investment was crowded out. Thus fiscal policy,
rather than NBP policy is at the root of the "credit tightness"
borrowers complain about.
Some conclusions
A review of the Polish experience reopens some important
stabilization policy issues. The first concerns the new orthodoxy
that calls for a "heterodox" (a multiple anchor) approach. The
success achieved by the Polish government in bringing inflation
under control in the course of the first six months of 1990 can be
ascribed to the stringent fiscal and monetary measures. It is,
however, open to doubt whether the foreign currency "anchor"
contributed to the restoration of price stability. The linkage of
the zloty to the dollar does not seem to have calmed down the
inflationary expectations. Moreover, as long as the zloty was
undervalued, the "anchor" exerted an upward price pull. When, in
1991, the "anchor" began to hold down the prices, it was hoisted.
The second question concerns the motor of persistence of the
inflation. As the transition-triggered recession deepened, the
government found itself incapable of balancing the budget. The
monetization of the fiscal deficit explains the rise in prices in
the 1991 to mid-1993 period. However, since mid - 1993, the real
21
value of the general government's debt held by the National Bank of
Poland declined, yet the rate of inflation continued to surpass 30
per cent per year. The culprit, the data indicate, is the "crawling
peg" - or, to be more precise, a crawling peg policy under which
the zloty was consistently undervalued. Undervaluation exerted an
upward pressure on prices through two channels: directly, through
the pricing of products that entered foreign trade, and indirectly,
via foreign reserve accumulation and growth of high power money.
The "crawl" mechanism provided a backward linkage from prices to
the exchange rate and perpetuated the inflationary cycle.
The third question is about the wisdom of covering the fiscal
deficit through commercial placement of government securities. This
method of deficit financing is non-inflationary, hence it avoids
imposing a tax on cash balances. However, the commercial placement
of government loans raises the total demand for loanable funds,
raising the real interest rate, which is tantamount to the
imposition of an investment tax. The ills accompanying inflation
are well known; yet the ills resulting from the commercial bank
financing of deficits are no less real. In Poland the banks have
been funnelling resources to the government and away from the
productive sectors of the economy. A government of an economy in
transition eager to promote investment should not, therefore,
finance its fiscal deficit by borrowing from commercial banks. The
22
first best way to avoid inflation is to balance the budget by
trimming inessential expenditures and by levying explicit taxes
that do not excessively distort the economy.
23
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